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Abstract
Two studies examined misperceptions of disagreement in partisan social conflicts, namely in the
debates over abortion (Study 1) and national politics (Study 2). We observed that partisans tend
to exaggerate differences of opinion with their adversaries. Further, we found that perceptions of
disagreement were most pronounced concerning values that were most important or central to
the perceiver’s own ideology, whereas partisans perceived much less disagreement with respect
to values central to their adversaries’ ideology. To the extent that partisans assumed
disagreement concerning personally-important values, they were also inaccurate in perceiving
their adversaries’ actual opinions. Discussion focuses on the cognitive mechanisms underlying
misperceptions of disagreement and strategies for reducing intergroup conflict suggested by our
data.
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Misperceptions in Intergroup Conflict: Disagreeing About What We Disagree About
“In all matters of opinion, our adversaries are completely insane”- Oscar Wilde
Members of partisan social groups often view their adversaries with suspicion, distrust,
and outright animosity. It is not unusual to hear loyal members of the Republican party complain
about Democrat’s “attack on traditional family values and the free market” while at the same
time hearing loyal Democrats chastise Republicans for their “war on the poor” or their “siege on
the environment.” Such inflamed beliefs characterize not only disputes between these two
political parties, but can also be heard in the debates between other social groups with competing
ideologies, such as labor-management conflicts, environmentalist-business struggles, tensions
between warring nations, and race-related problems. Undoubtedly, these hostile perceptions fuel
much of the conflict and discord that surrounds intergroup relations. This paper explores several
open questions about intergroup perception. Just how accurate are partisans at perceiving the
motives, goals, and opinions of their adversaries? Where do their perceptions go astray? And
why do they do so?
The little work that has been carried out on perception of intergroup attitudes has
demonstrated the gross inaccuracies of perceiver’s intuitions. In one of the first studies in this
area, Robinson and colleagues (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995) presented pro-choice
and pro-life college students with scenarios describing cases of abortion (e.g., a high-school age
girl who became pregnant). For each scenario, participants expressed the level of sympathy they
personally felt regarding the scenario and estimated the level of sympathy felt by the typical prochoice and pro-life participant in the study. Not only did they find widespread perceptions of
disagreement among both partisan groups, but these perceptions, when compared to the selfreport ratings made by their adversaries, proved to be greatly exaggerated. For example, pro-
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choice participants assumed they felt more sympathy than the pro-life participants would when,
in fact, both groups reported feeling equally sympathetic.
They replicated these perceptions of disagreement with other item responses (e.g.,
estimates of the number of pregnancies resulting from casual affairs) and with other partisan
social groups, pointing to the generality of this finding (see also Keltner & Robinson, 1996,
1997; Robinson & Friedman, 1995; Robinson & Keltner, 1996; Thompson, 1995; Thompson &
Nadler, 2000). These results compliment and extend now classic research inspired by social
judgment theory which found that members of partisan groups exaggerated the extremity of
messages advocating their adversaries’ point of view (e.g., Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957).
Our research takes the Robinson et al. (1995) findings as a starting point and extends this
research by considering both the exact nature and source of disagreement perceptions. Like
Robinson and colleagues, we assume that partisans often exaggerate the extent of disagreement
with an outgroup. We differ from them by contending that perceptions of disagreement are most
prevalent for those values which are core to, or defining of, the perceiver’s own ideological
stance. In essence, partisans assume that their adversaries contest the very values they care most
deeply about (see the General Discussion a description of the presumed cognitive mechanisms).
Thus, we assume that Republicans see Democrats as desiring to undermine traditional family
values—one of the values central to the conservative world view-- while Democrats view
Republicans as wanting to deprive the rights and opportunities of the poor—one of the values
central to the liberal world view. These perceptions may prove faulty because the typical
Democrat probably favors family values and the typical Republican probably favors the rights of
the poor, and thus, each side will overestimate the true margin of disagreement.
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At the same time, we suspect that partisans will perceive far less disagreement between
themselves and the outgroup with respect to values which are core to their adversaries’
ideological position. A person with strong pro-choice leanings, for instance, may favor “the
value of human life” (a value typically associated with the pro-life stance) and accurately
recognize that those on the pro-life side would as well. Hence, the pro-choice person will see
minimal difference between her position on this value and that of her pro-life adversaries. In this
case, there will be a closer correspondence between what partisans assume their adversaries
believe and what their adversaries actually report believing.
We conducted two studies to test our hypotheses about assumed (and factual) bases of
disagreement, in the context of the debates over abortion (Study 1) and politics (Study 2). In each
study, we asked members of partisan social groups to make judgments regarding value issues
that were either central or non-central to their partisan philosophy. In these studies, we selected
value issues that were central to the position of a given partisan group while not being central to
the position of individuals in the opposing partisan group. For each issue, partisans reported their
personal position (“favor” or “oppose”) and estimated the position of the typical outgroup
member.1 As in Robinson et al. (1995), we compared these responses to obtain three types of
indexes: actual disagreement (i.e., self-rating vs. outgroup’s self-rating), perceived disagreement
(i.e., self-rating vs. outgroup estimate) and overestimated disagreement (i.e., outgroup estimate
vs. outgroup’s self-rating). We predicted that partisans would perceive (and indeed, exaggerate)
disagreement with members of the adversarial group most dramatically on those value issues
central to their own philosophical position. For less central value issues, we predicted partisans
would perceive less disagreement and these perceptions would achieve a greater degree of
accuracy.

Misperceptions

6

Study 1: Abortion
We had college-age students on both sides of the abortion debate express their own
positions and estimate the typical outgroup member’s position regarding four value issues: the
value of human life, a moral code of sexual conduct, women’s reproductive freedom, and
freedom from government interference in private lives. The former two are issues frequently
cited by pro-life persons as a rationale for eliminating legalized abortion. In contrast, pro-choice
individuals often mention the latter two issues as grounds to maintain the legal status of abortion.
Thus, it appears that these sets of values are central to the pro-life and pro-choice ideological
positions, respectively, and therefore examining perceptions regarding these issues afforded a
test of our key hypotheses.
Method
Participants (N = 199) were University of Iowa students enrolled in an elementary
psychology course. We invited participants with strong opinions for and against the legalization
of abortion to participate. Participants were given a questionnaire which asked them to first
identify their attitude towards legalized abortion (-5 = strongly opposed to, +5 = strongly in favor
of). Participants were then presented with the 2 “pro-choice” value issues (A woman’s right to
determine her own reproductive course and Freedom from government interference in private
lives), and the 2 “pro-life” issues (The value of human life and A moral code that demands
responsibility for sexual conduct), with the order of the first and last two value issues
counterbalanced across participants. For each issue, participants indicated their own position and
estimated the position of the typical outgroup member on a single scale anchored by strongly
opposed to (-5) and strongly in favor of (+5). To verify our intuitions that these values
differentiated the core beliefs of each group, participants then rated (1 = not at all important, 11
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= very important) and rank-ordered (1 = most important, 4 = least important) each value issue in
terms of its importance to their attitude stance.
Results
For all of the reported analyses, we averaged participants’ ratings for the two pro-choice
value issues and the two pro-life value issues.2
Value importance. Consistent with their self-proclaimed ideological positions, pro-choice
participants rated and ranked the pro-choice value issues as more important to their attitude
stance than the pro-life values, t’s(124) ≥ 3.63, p’s < .001, d’s ≥ 0.32. Pro-life participants, on the
other hand, felt the pro-life values were more important than the pro-choice values, t’s(73) >
8.75, p’s ≤ .001, d’s ≥ 1.02. These differences in perceived value importance represent a
necessary feature of our argument and are crucial to understanding the perceptions of
disagreement reported below.
Actual disagreement. To be sure, there existed real differences of opinion between the
groups. Relative to pro-life participants, pro-choicers had more favorable personal attitudes
towards the pro-choice value issues t(197) = 11.52, p < .001, d = 1.68, and less favorable
attitudes towards the pro-life issues, t(197) = 4.20, p < .001, d = 0.61 (see Tables 1 and 2). Thus,
the two groups differed in their self-reported positions towards the value issues, in a manner
congruent with their particular ideological preferences.
Perceived disagreement. To examine perceptions of disagreement, we compared
participants’ self-ratings and their estimates of the typical outgroup member. Larger scores
indicate a greater absolute difference between the perceived opinions of self and outgroup.3 We
did this separately for the pro-choice and pro-life values, and submitted scores to a 2 (group: prochoice vs. pro-life) X 2 (value issue: pro-choice vs. pro-life) mixed-model ANOVA, with value
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issue as a within-subjects factor. As predicted, perceived disagreement was much greater
concerning the important value issues than for the unimportant ones, as revealed by the highly
significant Group X Value Issue interaction, F(1, 196) = 186.32, p < .001, d = 0.97 (see Table
2).4
Looked at more closely, the pro-choice participants perceived more disagreement with
their pro-life counterparts with respect to “women’s reproductive rights” and “freedom from
interference” than with respect to “the value of human life” and “a moral code,” t(123) = 15.50, p
< .001, d = 1.39. The pro-life partisans saw matters much differently. For them, the true source
of disagreement was with respect to the value of human life and a moral code, which they
assumed they favored far more than pro-choicers did, while they perceived much less
disagreement between themselves and pro-choicers regarding the two pro-choice value issues,
t(73) = 5.74, p < .001, d = 0.67. There was also a significant main effect of value issue, F(1, 196)
= 8.51, p < .01, d = 0.21, which revealed that perceptions of disagreement were generally greater
about pro-choice values, and a non-significant main effect of group, F < 1, d = .06.
Overestimated disagreement. Clearly, partisans perceived larger intergroup differences of
opinion surrounding their own key values than about their adversaries’ key values. Given the
real differences of opinion already mentioned, to what extent were these imagined differences on
(or off) of the mark? We compared participants’ estimates of the outgroup opinion with the selfratings made by outgroup members as a benchmark. Lower (higher) numbers on this index
indicate that partisans underestimated (overestimated) the extent to which their adversaries
endorsed these admired values. In the 2 (group: pro-choice vs. pro-life) X 2 (value issue: prochoice vs. pro-life) ANOVA, there was the predicted Group X Value Issue interaction, F(1, 196)
= 34.09, p < .001, d = 0.41, indicating that both partisan groups were more inaccurate when it
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came to estimating their adversaries’ opinions for important issues rather than unimportant ones
(see Table 2). Pro-choice participants underestimated the favorability of pro-lifers’ opinions
towards the pro-choice values by a greater margin than they did for the pro-life values, t(123) =
3.80, p < .001, d = 0.34, while for pro-life participants, underestimation of the favorability of
pro-choicers’ opinions was more substantial for pro-life values than for pro-choice values, t(73)
= 4.55, p < .001, d = 0.53. There was also a significant main effect of group, F(1, 196) = 9.78, p
< .01, d = 0.22, revealing that pro-life participants were more inaccurate overall in estimating
pro-choicers’ true opinions, and a non-significant value issue main effect, F(1, 196) = 1.20, p >
.10, d = 0.08. Thus, not only did partisans assume their adversaries disagreed with them about
the values underlying their own ideologies, these assumptions did not match the reality of their
adversaries’ true beliefs and so tended to be highly exaggerated.
Replication. As a partial replication of Study 1, we contacted numerous pro-choice
advocacy groups around the Midwest and invited members of these groups to complete the same
questionnaire anonymously (located on an internet website). Like their pro-choice student
counterparts, these advocacy group members (N = 361) felt the pro-choice issues were more
important than the pro-life issues, t’s(350) ≥ 8.80, p’s ≤ .001, d’s ≥ 0.47. Most importantly, they
perceived far more disagreement with pro-lifers about pro-choice issues than about pro-life
issues, t(348) = 31.87, p < .001, d = 1.70 (see Table 3). Interestingly, advocacy group members
were even more extreme than our sample of college students were in how much disagreement
they perceived about pro-choice issues, t(473) = 5.72, p < .001, d = 0.59. Advocacy group
members and college students were more comparable in their perceptions about pro-life value
issues, t(473) = 1.81, p = .04, d = 0.19. Two important points may be made about these findings.
First, a reasonable assumption would be that advocacy group members might have a more
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balanced, nuanced view of their adversaries’ opinions by virtue of their repeated exposure to prolifers’ rhetoric and arguments. They did not. Second, these deeply committed advocacy group
members were especially prone to perceive disagreement with their adversaries about personallyimportant issues. This suggests that attitude strength (or issue commitment) may moderate
asymmetrical perceptions of disagreement.
Study 2: Politics
Our main goal in Study 2 was to extend these findings to a new domain of social conflict,
namely the ongoing debate between Republicans and Democrats over national and international
policy. Unlike with the partisan groups involved in the abortion debate, the agendas of these two
groups are not mutually exclusive. Republican values seem to embrace a strong national defense
and strict deterrence of crime, while Democrat values seem to embrace the elimination social
inequalities and strengthening the public education system. Pre-testing conducted in our
laboratory prior to this study confirmed that the groups did in fact view these values as being
highly important to their political philosophies. While there is probably substantial overlap in the
opinions of both groups regarding these values, our intuitions nevertheless told us that members
of these partisans social groups would perceive (and overestimate) disagreement with their
political adversaries, particularly for the values defining their own party doctrine.
A second broad goal of Study 2 was to examine the perceptions of individuals who were
unaffiliated with either of the partisan groups. Our claim is that partisans assume disagreement
with their adversaries along personally-relevant value issues rather than less relevant ones. This
suggests that unaffiliated individuals (who do not subscribe to one set of values over another)
would be less prone to the perceptions of disagreement that afflict partisans, and particularly, the
highly exaggerated perceptions about personally-relevant values. To test this possibility, we
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included a group of politically-neutral participants and contrasted their responses with those of
our Republican and Democrat samples.
Method
We pre-tested a large number of political issues to identify a set of four which
differentiated the Republican and Democrat philosophies. Participants (N = 88) in the main study
were students recruited from an elementary psychology course at the University of Iowa. They
were administered a questionnaire structured identically to the other studies, except they first
indicated their political affiliation (Republican, Democrat, Neutral/Unaffiliated), and we
substituted the abortion-related issues with the two value issues rated most important by
Republicans (crime prevention and a strong military) and the two value issues rated most
important by Democrats (funding of public education and eliminating social inequality) in pretesting.
Results
For all of the reported analyses, we averaged responses to the two conservative and two
liberal value issues.5
Value importance. Not surprisingly, Republicans felt the two traditionally conservative
value issues were more important to their political stance than the two traditionally liberal issues,
t’s(27) ≥ 1.88, p’s ≤ .07, d’s ≥ 0.36. In contrast, Democrats felt the liberal issues were more
important than the conservative issues, t’s(28) ≥ 5.14, p’s ≤ .001, d’s ≥ 0.95.
Actual disagreement. Republicans had more favorable personal attitudes towards the
conservative value issues than the Democrats did, t(55) = 4.56, p < .001, d = 1.21, while
Democrats had more favorable attitudes towards the liberal issues than the Republicans did, t(55)
= 6.23, p < .001, d = 1.65 (see Tables 4 and 5).
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Perceived disagreement. Once again, partisans presumed more disagreement with their
adversaries concerning personally-important value issues than for less important ones, as
highlighted by the significant Group X Value Issue interaction, F(1, 55) = 37.26, p < .001,
d = 0.81 (see Table 5). More precisely, Republicans perceived greater disagreement with
Democrats about the conservative values than about the liberal values, t(27) = 5.98, p < .001,
d = 1.13, while Democrats perceived greater disagreement with Republicans about the liberal
value issues than about the conservative ones, t(28) = 3.21, p < .01, d = 0.60. There was also a
(trivial) main effect of group, F(1, 55) = 6.14, p < .05, d = 0.66, indicating that Democrats
perceived more overall disagreement than Republicans did, and a non-significant value issue
main effect, F < 1, d = 0.26.
The politically-neutral participants, however, saw much less disagreement between
Republicans and Democrats than these groups saw between themselves, at least in regards to the
personally-important value issues. Concerning conservative value issues, Republicans saw more
difference of opinion between themselves and Democrats than neutrals perceived between the
two groups, t(56) = 3.41, p < .01, d = 0.89, while for liberal value issues, Democrats perceived
more disagreement with Republicans than neutrals perceived between the groups, t(57) = 3.48, p
< .01, d = 0.90.
Overestimated disagreement. Both Republicans and Democrats underestimated the
favorability of each others’ opinions for personally-important value issues by a greater margin
than they did for the less important ones, as revealed by the significant Group X Value Issue
interaction, F(1, 55) = 26.93, p < .001, d = 1.37 (see Table 5). Among Democrats,
underestimation of the Republican position was much greater for the liberal value issues than for
the conservative issues t(28) = 6.15, p < .001, d = 1.14, while among Republicans,
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underestimation of the Democratic position was slightly greater for the conservative issues than
for the liberal issues, but to a non-significant degree, t < 1, d = 0.15. There was also a significant
value issue main effect, F(1, 55) = 17.61, p < .001, d = 0.56, showing that Republicans and
Democrats were overall less accurate in estimating their adversaries’ opinions about liberal value
issues, and a non-significant main effect of group, F < 1, d = 0.16.
Here as well, the politically-neutral participants had a more balanced and accurate view
of the partisans’ true opinions than the partisans had about each other. In fact, Republicans
underestimated the Democrat position towards the conservative values by a greater margin than
the neutrals did, t(56) = 2.87, p < .01, d = 0.77, and Democrats underestimated the attitudes of
Republicans towards the liberal value issues by a greater margin than the neutrals did, t(57) =
1.83, p = .07, d = 0.48.
General Discussion
Researchers have established that member of partisan groups tend to have inaccurate
perceptions regarding the attitudes and advocated positions of outgroup members (Robinson et
al., 1995; Hovland et al., 1957). The present research examines the precise nature of these
exaggerated perceptions. Our research suggests that partisans are most likely to perceive
disagreement regarding those value issues they see as most central to their position.
The partisans in our studies were more alike in their opinions than they knew, and this fact was
lost on them because, in their minds, the conflict was not about their adversaries’ central values
but their own. Ironically, this led to a situation where partisans disagreed about what they
disagree about. Each side saw the other as irrationally and stubbornly challenging the very
foundation of their personal ideologies, while seeing consensus of opinion about their
adversaries’ core values. Partisans seemed oblivious to the possibility that their adversaries
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shared many of their preferences and values, but differed primarily in how they prioritized those
values. These misperceptions, in turn, may cultivate the very feelings of hostility and mistrust
that lead to intergroup conflict in the first place.
We are left to speculate on the causes of these misperceptions. We believe a leading
candidate explanation is cognitive egocentrism, or the tendency to give unwarranted attention to
self-relevant information at the expense of information about other people (Chambers &
Windschitl, 2004; Kruger, 1999; Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Applied to the present context,
egocentrism suggests that partisans may think about their adversaries-- and the conflict more
generally-- primarily from the vantage point of their own values. They may take their adversaries
contrary position in the overall social debate as evidence that their adversaries oppose the values
they see as the primary justification for their own position in this debate.
According to this egocentric view, partisans don’t sufficiently consider the possibility
that their adversaries define the debate according to a different set of ideological values. From
this perspective, one reason those on the pro-choice side see their opponents as combative,
illogical, and dogmatic is because, in the pro-choice mindset, pro-life advocates desire to
undermine what they believe is as most at stake in the abortion debate—women’s right to selfdetermination (for similar findings concerning union-management negotiations, see Robinson &
Friedman, 1995). They have difficulty appreciating that pro-lifers oppose legalized abortion
because of a deep devotion to a competing value, namely, the reverence for human life (for
research demonstrating the role of egocentrism in other intergroup situations, see Thompson &
Loewenstein, 1992; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996; and in perspective-taking
more generally, see Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Nickerson, 1999; Ross,
Greene, & House, 1977; Hass, 1986).
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An explanation based upon self or ingroup-enhancement motivations seems less tenable
for several reasons. For one, partisans acknowledged their adversaries’ favorable attitudes
towards personally-unimportant but admirable value issues, even admitting that they themselves
had less favorable positions towards those issues. Partisans judged their adversaries to have more
admirable positions even though their absolute importance ratings for those values implied that
they were perceived as moderately relevant to their personal attitudes. A purely motivational
account (one based upon ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation) might suggest that
partisans would perceive their adversaries’ as less admirable on all value issues, which the
partisans in our studies clearly did not do. General group stereotypes also seem less plausible as
an explanation for our findings. If general stereotypes were operating, we would expect to see
some uniformity in the estimates offered by different groups about their own and their
adversaries’ opinions (e.g., a stereotype that Democrats disfavor a strong military would imply
that Republican, Democrat, and politically-neutral persons alike would share this belief).
Do our findings suggest any practical solutions for reducing intergroup conflict, and
perhaps, conflict in other types of social bonds? The first and perhaps most obvious solution is
informing partisans about the actual basis for their adversaries’ opinions, specifically challenging
their misconceptions about their adversaries’ opinions about personally-relevant values (for
research gauging the effectiveness of this solution, see Keltner & Robinson, 1993; Thompson &
Hastie, 1990). A second and more subtle approach, one that has yet to be empirically tested,
would be to have partisans think about the social conflict through the frame of their adversaries’
ideological values. Doing so might bring partisans to the realization that, not only is there an
alternative and equally-valid set of ideals involved in the debate, there is shared opinion between
self and adversaries about those ideals. Indeed, the recognition one’s adversaries hold a more
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favorable opinion about those values than does oneself (as occurred in the present studies) may
be a powerful antidote against feelings of enmity and mistrust.

Misperceptions

17

Author Notes
John R. Chambers, Department of Psychology, University of Iowa (after August 2005, at
the Department of Psychology, University of Florida). Robert S. Baron, Department of
Psychology, University of Iowa. Mary L. Inman, Department of Psychology, Hope College.
We are grateful to Paul Windschitl for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
This research was aided by a University of Iowa Dissertation Fellowship to the first
author.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to John R. Chambers,
Department of Psychology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242. E-mail: johnchambers@uiowa.edu

Misperceptions

18

Footnotes
1

In each study, we also collected estimates of the ingroup opinion. These estimates were

highly similar to self-ratings in all cases. Therefore, our findings and conclusions about
perceived disagreement also extend to situations where partisans think about general differences
of opinion between ingroup and outgroup members.
2

Analyses of the individual items (comparing responses to the various important and

unimportant value issues) yielded similar results.
3

We were interested only in the absolute magnitude of perceived differences of opinion.

Nevertheless, all of the reported differences in perceived disagreement remain significant when
the direction of estimated opinion was taken into account.
4

Partisans also tended to exaggerate the actual amount of disagreement with their

adversaries concerning personally important value issues. For example, pro-choice participants
in Study 1 had more favorable attitudes towards the pro-choice issues than the pro-lifers had, but
their perceptions about this difference were highly inflated.
5

Degrees of freedom vary slightly due to missing responses.
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Table 1
Average self-ratings and outgroup estimates among pro-choice and pro-life participants in Study 1
Self
ratings

Outgroup
estimates
PCs
PLs
of PLs
of PCs
M
M
(SD)
(SD)

PCs
(n = 125)
M
(SD)

PLs
(n = 74)
M
(SD)

Reproductive rights

4.09
(1.28)

-0.04
(3.09)

-1.85
(2.65)

2.64
(2.84)

Freedom from interference

3.15
(1.78)

1.61
(2.24)

-0.53
(2.88)

1.86
(3.29)

3.62
(1.32)

0.78
(2.16)

-1.19
(2.35)

2.25
(2.58)

Value of human life

3.90
(1.34)

4.58
(0.70)

3.13
(2.84)

0.92
(2.84)

Moral code of sexual conduct

1.81
(2.75)

2.99
(1.90)

2.82
(2.81)

-1.38
(2.53)

Value issue

Average pro-choice values

Average pro-life values

2.85
3.78
2.97
-0.23
(1.70)
(1.11)
(2.63)
(2.21)
Note: PC = Pro-choice, PL = Pro-life. Self-ratings and outgroup estimates were made on a -5 (strong opposed to) to +5 (strongly in
favor of) scale. Numbers in bold represent important value issues for the group in question, whereas those in italics represent less
important value issues.
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Table 2
Average actual, perceived, and overestimated disagreement among pro-choice and pro-life participants in Study 1

Value issue

Actual
disagreement
M
(SE)

Perceived
disagreement
Among Among
PCs
PLs
M
M
(SD)
(SD)

Overestimated
disagreement
PCs
PLs
of PLs
of PCs
M
M
(SD)
(SD)

Reproductive rights

4.13
(0.31)

5.94
(3.05)

2.68
(4.75)

-1.81
(2.65)

-1.45
(2.83)

Freedom from interference

1.54
(0.29)

3.68
(3.33)

0.26
(3.89)

-2.14
(2.88)

-1.29
(3.29)

2.84
(0.25)

4.81
(2.73)

1.47
(3.41)

-1.97
(2.35)

-1.37
(2.58)

Value of human life

0.69
(0.17)

0.77
(3.12)

3.66
(2.84)

-1.45
(2.84)

-2.98
(2.84)

Moral code of sexual conduct

1.18
(0.36)

1.00
(4.36)

4.36
(3.28)

-0.17
(2.81)

-3.19
(2.53)

Average pro-choice values

Average pro-life values

0.93
0.90
4.01
-0.82
-3.08
(0.22)
(1.75)
(2.55)
(2.63)
(2.21)
Note: PC = Pro-choice, PL = Pro-life. Actual disagreement computed from the absolute difference between PL’s self-ratings and PC’s
self-ratings. Perceived disagreement was computed from the absolute difference between self-ratings and outgroup estimates.
Overestimated disagreement was computed by subtracting the outgroup’s self-ratings from outgroup estimates. Numbers in bold
represent important value issues for the group in question, whereas those in italics represent less important value issues.
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Table 3
Average self-ratings, outgroup estimates, and perceived disagreement among pro-choice advocacy group members in replication
Self
ratings
PCs
(n = 361)
M
(SD)

Outgroup
estimates
PCs
of PLs
M
(SD)

Perceived
disagreement
Among
PC’s
M
(SD)

Reproductive rights

4.87
(0.45)

-3.37
(2.12)

8.24
(2.16)

Freedom from interference

3.84
(1.31)

-0.48
(3.17)

4.32
(3.68)

4.36
(0.73)

-1.93
(2.12)

6.28
(2.38)

Value of human life

4.59
(0.96)

3.71
(2.61)

0.88
(2.62)

Moral code of sexual conduct

2.37
(2.98)

4.05
(1.96)

1.68
(3.46)

Value issue

Average pro-choice values

Average pro-life values

3.48
3.87
1.28
(1.57)
(1.87)
(2.11)
Note: PC = Pro-choice, PL = Pro-life. Self-ratings and outgroup estimates were made on a -5 (strong opposed to) to +5 (strongly in
favor of) scale. Perceived disagreement was computed from the absolute difference between self-ratings and outgroup estimates.
Numbers in bold represent important value issues for the group in question, whereas those in italics represent less important value
issues.
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Table 4
Average self-ratings and outgroup estimates among Republican, Democrat, and Neutral participants in Study 2

Value issue

Self
ratings
REPs
DEMs
(n = 28) (n = 29)
M
M
(SD)
(SD)

REPs
of DEMs
M
(SD)

Outgroup
estimates
DEMs
NEUTs
of REPs
of REPs
M
M
(SD)
(SD)

NEUTs
of DEMs
M
(SD)

Public education

3.75
(1.18)

4.52
(1.09)

3.43
(1.32)

1.07
(2.58)

1.97
(2.37)

3.00
(1.62)

Eliminating poverty

2.04
(1.69)

4.31
(0.89)

3.89
(1.34)

-0.34
(2.54)

0.80
(2.11)

3.00
(2.23)

2.89
(1.09)

4.41
(0.72)

3.66
(1.12)

0.36
(2.31)

1.38
(1.97)

3.00
(1.76)

Crime prevention

3.57
(1.26)

1.79
(2.62)

0.85
(2.23)

3.76
(1.35)

2.97
(2.67)

1.33
(2.28)

Strong military

3.79
(1.20)

1.21
(2.41

0.04
(2.08)

4.24
(0.83)

3.23
(2.32)

2.13
(1.80)

Average Democrat values

Average Republican values

3.68
1.50
0.44
4.00
3.10
1.73
(1.00)
(2.33)
(1.88)
(1.04)
(1.88)
(1.52)
Note: REP = Republican, DEM = Democrat, NEUT = Neutral. Self-ratings and outgroup estimates were made on a -5 (strong opposed
to) to +5 (strongly in favor of) scale. Numbers in bold represent important value issues for the group in question, whereas those in
italics represent less important value issues.
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Table 5
Average actual, perceived, and overestimated disagreement among Republican, Democrat, and Neutral participants in Study 2

Value issue

Actual
disagreement
M
(SE)

Perceived
disagreement
Among Among Among
REPs
DEMs
NEUTs
M
M
M
(SD)
(SD)
(SD)

REPs
of DEMs
M
(SD)

Overestimated
disagreement
DEMs
NEUTs
of REPs of DEMs
M
M
(SD)
(SD)

NEUTs
of REPs
M
(SD)

Public education

0.77
(0.30)

0.32
(1.66)

3.45
(2.53)

1.03
(3.03)

-1.09
(1.32)

-2.68
(2.58)

-1.52
(1.62)

-1.78
(2.37)

Eliminating poverty

2.28
(0.36)

1.86
(1.96)

4.66
(2.65)

2.20
(3.53)

-0.42
(1.34)

-2.38
(2.54)

-1.31
(2.23)

-1.24
(2.11)

1.52
(0.24)

1.09
(1.26)

4.05
(2.35)

1.62
(2.97)

-0.75
(1.12)

-2.53
(2.31)

-1.42
(1.76)

-1.51
(1.97)

Crime prevention

1.78
(0.55)

2.72
(1.96)

1.97
(3.11)

1.63
(3.70)

-0.94
(2.19)

0.19
(1.35)

-0.46
(2.28)

-0.60
(2.27)

Strong military

2.58
(0.51)

3.75
(2.19)

3.03
(2.65)

1.10
(3.19)

-1.17
(2.08)

0.45
(0.83)

0.92
(1.80)

-0.56
(2.31)

Average Democrat values

Average Republican values

1.37
0.32
0.23
2.18
3.23
2.50
-1.06
-0.58
(2.49)
(1.04)
(1.52)
(0.48)
(1.53)
(2.67)
(1.89)
(1.88)
Note: REP = Republican, DEM = Democrat, NEUT = Neutral. Actual disagreement was computed from the absolute difference
between REP’s self-ratings and DEM’s self-ratings. Perceived disagreement was computed from the absolute difference between selfratings and outgroup estimates (among NEUT, perceived disagreement was the absolute difference between outgroup estimates about
REPs and DEMs). Overestimated disagreement was computed by subtracting the outgroup’s self-ratings from outgroup estimates.
Numbers in bold represent important value issues for the group in question, whereas those in italics represent less important value
issues.

Misperceptions

26

